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COMMENTARY: “On the Mathematical Beauty of Aviccena’s Model of the God-
World Relation,” by Matthew Williams 
 In his paper “Contrasting Models of the God-World Relationship: Avicenna, 
Maimonides and Al-Shahrasānī,” Harrington Critchley makes a very cogent argument for 
the superior adaptability of Avicenna’s model for the necessary existence of God, as 
compared to Maimonides’ and Al-Shahrasānī’s own. Though there are certainly problems 
to be found in Avicenna’s model, I would prefer to take this opportunity to admire rather 
than critique it. 
Certainly, since the time of Avicenna at least, there have been more scientifically-
minded and evidentially-structured models seeking to show God’s necessary existence—I 
am here thinking chiefly of William Paley’s “Evidence of Design,” and Robin Le 
Poidevin’s “Are We the Outcome of Chance or Design?”—that argue the same thing he 
does; however, few if any express the same sort of mathematical beauty in their 
formulation. Though it would be nearly another 850 years before Georg Cantor 
developed the ‘Theory of Sets’ in mathematics, Avicenna we see a very basic, yet elegant 
operation of these same principles. 
In set theoretical mathematics, the basic premise is that the entirety of the world 
can be broken down into these abstract representations that we call sets. While this relates 
primarily to mathematical objects such as numbers, it can be applied to real objects as 
well. In a way, Avicenna accomplishes this with his representation of God as the 
“Necessary Existent.” Wish that I could go into greater detail on this for the sake of 
formal proof than space allows me, but as I cannot I ask that my audience grant me some 
liberties in making certain claims and assumptions. I assure you, all of them are valid; 
they merely want of a fuller explanation than I may give here. 
The most basic premise of Avicenna’s is that ‘the Necessary Existent “has no 
cause,” so as to be necessary “in all [His] aspects’” (emphasis my own). This tells us that 
the most prominent attribute of God is His necessity. Even his relationship with all his 
other attributes is secondary to this one, out of which they obtain. Right out of the gate 
here, we are presented with the primary relation of both God and the universe itself: The 
nature of necessity. Now, if God cannot be defined in terms of his other attributes without 
them in turn being defined by necessity, it follows that his other traits are an output of 
necessity. 
In this way, we are granted the authority to claim that God is defined by his 
relation to necessity; or that xRx, where x can be either God or necessity, for they mean 
in this case one and the same thing: That without which none else may exist. Recall that 
God’s other attributes are outputs of their relation to necessity. So, for example, God’s 
transcendence must exist because it is necessary that God is transcends the material 
universe he created in order to have created it. This we can define as y = transcendence 
and belongs to the ordered pair of <x,y>, where any <x,y>={{x}, {x,y}}. Essentially, this 
tells us that all of God’s other attributes—such as his transcendence—are outflows from 
his necessity and these attributes cannot exist separately from it. 
“Now,” one might be tempted to say, “that is all very well and good, but what 
about the contingent order?,” i.e. the World and its tiers. “Surely the kind of necessity we 
speak of when we talk of God is not the same we speak of when we talk of contingent 
existence.” At first blush it seems this is true. After all, how can he who is outside of 
space-time be a product of the same sort of necessity that we are? But it is just this 
formulation of the question that is mistaken; instead we should ask how we could be a 
product of his type of necessity. As God is the Necessary Existent, his very existence 
defines the scope of understanding for necessity. And there is nothing within this scope 
that it would be remiss in its use to describe his relation to us. If necessity is not the 
problem here, then it must be our understanding of contingent. 
By contingent, we can take Avicenna to mean as ‘having a dependence upon 
some absolute transcendent necessary being to create it.’ If we take this as our definition, 
then it follows logically that the world itself (a) is a further output of God’s necessity (a 
set A), such that it is both an element and a subset of it (a⊊A). However, the modes of 
being for the Necessary Existent and the contingent world are too different for this alone 
to be enough; we must disjoint them somehow. In order to make them disjoint we must 
conceive of world’s relation to God as somehow being functional. Thankfully, Avicenna 
provides one such possibility in the contingent world possessing the same form of 
necessity, but not the same degree, because God encompasses even the negation of those 
features which are ascribed to him. This negation is an outflow of his true being. 
Existence in the contingent world then is a function of God. It stems in the first 
place from the fact that the domain of necessity acts upon all attributes of God, including 
those which are negated of him. So, those negated attributes, while necessary, cannot 
exist within God; as a result, they find themselves the function of an external expression 
of God’s necessity, such that   	
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element of God (the domain) which by definition cannot be contained within himself are 
represented in the world as expressions of  the range, via a relation of necessity. 
Thus, we have a functional relationship between the Necessary Existent and the 
contingent world that has but a single element at its base: The concept of necessity. 
Though I have rather messily gone about constructing this set theoretical representation 
of Avicenna’s argument for the existence of God—indeed, I have skipped whole proofs 
in the process—it has much merit and a sense of mathematical elegance to it that one 
does not see in other models. Given more time, I believe it would be possible to create a 
properly rigorous version of this. However, in as loose a form as time has allowed, I hope 
to have shown at least a small fraction of the mathematical beauty inherent in Avicenna’s 
model of the God-World. 
